### 1nc – K

#### Settler colonialism requires the death of Native and Black life in order to secure its material and symbolic coordinates, necessitating fascist institutions that produce violence.

Robinson, 2017 (ROWLAND “ENA͞EMAEHKIW” KESHENA ROBINSON, “Fascism and Anti-Fascism: A Decolonial Perspective”, February 11, <https://onkwehonwerising.wordpress.com/2017/02/11/fascism-anti-fascism-a-decolonial-perspective/>, shae)

In the wake of the election of Donald Trump to the south of the colonial border, there has been a blooming of discussion on fascism and the necessity for anti-fascist organizing amongst various left-wing streams of thought: anarchists, marxists, anti-racists, as well as others. This has only increased in the wake of his inauguration, the subsequent series of worrying (though unsurprising) executive orders that he has issued since taking the office, and the resistance that has flourished against them. Whether or not Trump himself is a fascist is a question that is up for debate. It is also arguable whether certain key political figures within his inner circle, such as Steve Bannon, also represent fascism, or at the very least, para-fascist. Undeniable though is that Trump and his closest advisers are right-wing national-populists, which in the context of the northern bloc of settler colonialism is, invariably, inseparable from white nationalism. What is undeniable is that a number of explicitly white nationalist organizations, theorists and influencers have been highly motivated and emboldened by Trump and his broad popular support amongst american settlers, across gender and class lines, who perceive america as having been betrayed and dirtied by immigrants, “minorities,” queer, trans and gender non-conforming people, feminists and a neoliberal capitalism that has sent industrial jobs overseas. Driven by these broad feelings of white ressentiment, and thirsting for a new frontier, these prophets of naked and proud white power, such as Richard Spencer, rallied to Trump’s campaign, and now presidency. Whether they will continue to stay in Trump’s corner though is yet to be seen. Additionally, as I write this from canada it would be foolhardy to believe that this country is hermetically sealed from what has been going on south of the border. Prominent figures in the race to replace Stephen Harper as the leader of the federal Conservative Party have sought to emulate Trump’s rhetoric, and have even openly called for bringing his message here. Do not forget that before Trump’s executive orders barring immigration from seven Muslim majority countries and authorizing the building of a wall on Mexican border, the late Harper administration passed the nakedly Islamophobic Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, as well as the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 (Bill C-51) and the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (Bill C-24), two laws which have respectively strengthened the already existing canadian surveillance state and allowed for the stripping of canadian citizenship from dual citizens and those with the ability to obtain dual citizenship. None of these are issues that been positively acted upon by the current Liberal Party government of Justin Trudeau. Most strikingly, and tragically, of course, is the recent shooting at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City. This event, which cost six lives, was carried out by a french-speaking settler who openly espoused support for the right-wing national-populism and Islamophobic politics of Trump, as well as Marine Le Pen in France. Many fear that acts such as this could be the tip of the iceberg, rather than some sort of isolated lone-wolf type incident. In general, while the emergence of the north american far-right goes back further than Trump, and was certainly emboldened by the election of Barack Obama as the first non-white person to the office of the president, Trump’s campaign and subsequent electoral victory has undeniably led to a marked acceleration of the movement. For the time being, naked white nationalists feel that they now have one of their own in the White(st) House, or, at the very least, someone who will lend them their ear when they come calling and who’s movement they can springboard off of in order to further build their own. I also know and want to recognize, that many people are scared as well of the current situation. As I noted in my commentary on the Trump election, my mother called me at nearly 3 in the morning to tell me that she felt like she was going to throw up. Similarly, my younger brother told me that he felt as though he may have to leave his job because of the smothering atmosphere of Trumpian white nationalism in his workplace. Since the election I have read what seems like daily updates of the fear, depression and rage felt by many of my fellow Indigenous scholars, and many, many non-scholars, as Trump has re-activated pipeline deals, ordered the construction of a border wall to keep out our relatives from south of the Rio Grande, and hung a painting of perhaps america’s most prolific Indian killing president, Andrew Jackson, in the Oval Office. The fears and worries being experienced and expressed by family, friends, colleagues and comrades across Turtle Island are palpable, and it would be cold, as well as disingenuous, for me to not give space and voice to those feelings. Bracketing off some of these issues though, what I want to do here is to ask a basic question: what is fascism? And, more particular to what I want to say here, what does fascism mean to Indigenous people in light of the particular conditions of settler colonialism? Is it even a useful analytic category for us in light of existent social conditions, technologies of governance and patterns of power? And, finally, what does anti-fascist struggle mean, or how should it be re-thought, in light of the struggle for decolonization? Defining Fascism So what is fascism then? Open any left-wing tome and you are bound to come across one of two definitions. The first, and perhaps more common these days, ~~views~~ [know] fascism as some form of particularly virulent authoritarian nationalism. Generally they attach fascism to manifestations of aggressive racism, reactionary and conservative traditionalism, anti-liberalism and anti-communism, as well as expansionist and revanchist approaches to foreign policy as part of a general movement towards the seizure of absolute political power, the elimination of opposition and the creation of a regulated economic structure to transform social relations within a modern, self-determined culture. Other essential features include a political aesthetic of romantic symbolism, mass mobilization, a positive view of violence, and promotion of masculinity, youth and charismatic leadership (Griffin and Feldman, 2004). The general historical examples of fascism, without paying much heed to unevenness between them, are the Italy of Mussolini and his Fascist Party and, of course, the National Socialist movement that seized political control of Germany in the early 1930s. Additionally they may look to Franco’s Spain, the clerical fascism of Romania under the Iron Guard and Ion Antonescu, or the various governments of Hungary in the 1930s and during the second world war. To the left of this essentially liberal-historical, though not entirely unhelpful, definition of fascism is that which is taken up by the majority of the revolutionary anti-capitalist movement, primarily by marxists, though also by some class-struggle anarchists as well. This particular definition traces itself back to the Bulgarian communist and General Secretary of the Communist International Georgi Dimitrov. Dimitrov’s famous description of fascism was of it as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital” (1935). While there is more that can be said about this particular formulation of fascism, its pithy nature most certainly does have a certain political appeal to it. However it also clearly lacks the degree of specificity that one might consider necessary to make it actually helpful. Reflecting on this lack of specificity within Dimitrov’s formulation of fascism, others have worked to delved deeper into aspects of the fascist experience to flesh it out further and to attempt to deliver a genuinely helpful analytic. In particular, political economist Zak Cope (2015), in his book Divided World Divided Class: Global Political Economy and the Stratification of Labour Under Capitalism, sums up the attempts to give more depth to the Dimitrovian analysis of fascism, and here it is worth quoting him at length. He says: Fascism is the attempt by the imperialist bourgeoisie to solidify its rule on the basis of popular middle-class support for counter-revolutionary dictatorship. Ideologically fascism is the relative admixture of authoritarianism, racism, militarism and pseudo-socialism necessary to make this bid successful. In the first place, authoritarianism justifies right-wing dictatorship aimed at robbing and repressing any and all actual or potential opponents of imperialist rule. Secondly, racism or extreme national chauvinism provides fascist rule with a pseudo-democratic facade, promising to level all distinctions of rank and class via national aggrandisement. Thirdly, militarism allows the fascist movement both to recruit déclassé ex-military and paramilitary elements to its cause and to prepare the popular conscience for the inevitable aggressive war. Finally, social-fascism offers higher wages and living standards to the national workforce at the expense of foreign and colonised workers. As such, denunciations of “unproductive” and “usurers” capital, of “bourgeois” nations (that is, the dominant imperialist nations) and of the workers’ betrayal by reformist “socialism” are part and parcel of the fascist appeal (294). As Cope further notes, this summation is not out of line with the pre-Dimitrov (and, also, pre-Hitlerian) discussion of fascism in the Programme of the Communist International, which noted that “[T]he combination of Social Democracy, corruption and active white terror, in conjunction with extreme imperialist aggression in the sphere of foreign politics, are the characteristic features of Fascism” (1929). However, as with most of the contemporary left, Cope essentially remains within the general contours of Dimitrov’s work, holding fascism to be an “exceptional form of the bourgeois state” (2015: 294). This particular definition of fascism is in many ways still is the definitive, go-to, definition amongst marxists and many anarchists. However, even in the move to expand upon it, it is in many striking ways woefully insufficient. In particular the traditional COMINTERN definition of fascism, while placing it in a relationship with capitalism, understates, if not outright ignores, the manner in which fascist movements are often actually oppositional to capitalism, or at least certain manifestations or elements of it. Several more recent attempts to think through the question of fascism have attempted to more fully flesh this out, against the inherited dogma of the left that sees the deployment of revolutionary or left-wing imagery and language by fascists as a smoke-screen to deceive the masses of working class people. Of particular note a the theoretical stream of thought inaugurated by Don Hammerquist’s work of the question in his article Fascism & Anti-Fascism. Here Hammerquist, himself an autonomist marxist, rejects the traditional, primarily marxist-leninist, Dimitri-derived view of fascism as simply a tool for big business. Hammequist states that: Colonial Violence Turned Inwards Moving beyond the re-theorizations offered by Hammerquist, Sakai and Lyons, for many, both inside and outside of the northern bloc of settler colonialism, the traditionalist formulations and definitions of fascism are ultimately insufficient for a host of other, equally important reasons. In this regard however, in his own reading of fascism, Cope does open up a window onto what I propose is the true heart of fascism. He says: “Geographically speaking, on its own soil fascism is imperialist repression turned inward” (294). This is an aspect of fascism which I believe is essentially missing from all other attempts to give definition to the phenomenon, from the liberal-historical to Dimitrov, to Hammequist, Sakai and Lyons, from both the pithy and the detailed, and whose central importance cannot possibly be overstated. In essence, following this line of reasoning, we can say that fascism is when the violence that the colonialist-imperialist nations have visited upon the world over the course of the development of the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system comes back home to visit. This direct lineal connection from colonial violence to fascism was beautifully, if disturbingly, described by Aimé Césaire in his Discourse on Colonialism (1972), saying: [W]e must show that each time a head is cut off or an eye put out in Vietnam and in France they accept the fact…each time a Madagascan is tortured and in France and they accept the fact, civilization acquires another dead weight, a universal regression takes place, a gangrene sets in, a center of infection begins to spread; and that at the end of all these treaties that have been violated, all these lies that have been propagated, all these punitive expeditions that have been tolerated, all these prisoners who have been tied up and “interrogated, all these patriots who have been tortured, at the end of all the racial pride that has been encouraged, all the boastfulness that has been displayed, a poison has been instilled into the veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds toward savagery (13). Regarding the shock of fascism’s recapitulation of colonial violence arriving on the shores of the homeland Césaire adds: People are surprised, they become indignant. They say: “How strange! But never mind-it’s Nazism, it will, pass!” And they wait, and they hope; and they hide the truth from themselves, that it is barbarism, but the supreme barbarism, the crowning barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarisms; that it is Nazism, yes, but that before they were its victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that before engulfing the whole of Western, Christian civilization in its reddened waters, it oozes, seeps, and trickles from every crack (14). So this brings me back to my secondary question, what does fascism mean to the Indigenous person? To the colonized? In particular, how can we read this as Cope adds that fascism “whilst on foreign soil” is “imperialist repression employed by comprador autocracies” (2014: 294) or when Hammerquist and Sakai discuss the globalization of fascism (2002; 2002)? To ask the question more precisely, what does it mean for an analysis of fascism when being on “foreign soil” is also being in its “own soil?” In other words, what, if anything, can fascism mean to those of us trapped within the belly of a violent settler colonial beast? For an anti-fascist theory and praxis then to carry any kind of meaningful weight it must contend with the fact of settler colonialism and its ongoing, central structuring of the entire symbolic, social and political orders of the northern bloc. **Anything else threatens to become a repetitive loop, unable to break through to the actual core of fascism**. The Terrain Below Fascism Building on this recognition of fascism as colonial violence turned inwards, we are immediately confronted with the truth that the terrain for even the possibility of the development of a domestic fascist movement within the spatial coordinates of the northern bloc is a terrain—in terms of both the literal material meaning of the land, as well as less direct meanings of the psychic, political, social, cultural, ideological and economic fields—is a terrain already soaked in blood. In particular it is a terrain that is already soaked in the blood of Native and Black Peoples. In the case of the northern bloc of settler colonialism, the sense of exteriority inherent in Césaire’s description of the perfection of what would become fascist oppression within the deployment of colonial violence overseas becomes interior. While for Césaire and Cope the violence of fascism is brought home from the distant colonies of the metropolitan powers, in the settler colonial context this violence is one that was perfected within the exceptional state of the expansion of the frontier, the clearing and civilizing of Indigenous People to make the land ripe for settlement, and the carceral continuum that has marked the Black experience on this land from chattel slavery to the modern hyperghetto. Thus, before one can even begin a discussion of fascism (or even capitalism for that matter[i]), and the possibility of its emergence on this land, it is important to recognize that fascism in the northern bloc can only occur in a context always-already defined by two fundamental axes: Native elimination and antiblack violence. These two axes, while being somewhat incommensurable with one another, also overlap, and of course also intersect with the general parasitism of the imperialist countries upon the Third World and other colonized peoples worldwide. Broadly we can say though that both the psychic and material life of white settler colonial society is sutured together by anti-Native and antiblack solidarity and violence. Settler Colonialism & Indigenous Genocide The united states and canada are a settler colonial estate. As noted above, this means that one of the principal features that distinguishes the settler colonialism of the northern bloc (as well as the australasian and israeli forms) from more traditionally theorized metropolitan, or franchise, colonialism is the fundamental drive towards the elimination of Native peoples (Veracini, 2010; Wolfe, 2006). This is what the late theorist of settler colonialism Patrick Wolfe referred to the logic of elimination when he described settler colonialism as an inclusive land-centred project that mobilizes a diverse assemblage of agencies with a programme of destroying Native nations in order that they may be replaced (2006). Indeed for there to even be a canada or a united states of america Native People must disappear in order for non-Native settlers to claim rightful ownership and title over the continent. Further the logic of elimination exists in a dialectic with an extensive project of settler self-indigenization. While this process is most stark in regions such as Appalachia and Quebec (Pearson, 2013) it is pervasive across the continent. Additionally, while much of these processes have taken place juridically, and are daily reinforced within the symbolic coding of the civil society of the white settler nation, these processes are, and always have been, drenched in literal Native blood. To define Native life under the existence of settler colonialism is to see it defined through the multiple, converging “vectors of death” arrayed against us, and our resistance to them (Churchill, 2001). All of these processes can be summed up in what Nicolas Juarez refers to as the grammars of suffering of Native life: clearing and civilization (2014). The former are those processes which not only destroy Native bodies and lives in the meat grinder of white invasion, but also evacuate Native sovereignty, not only from the spatial coordinates of the continent, but from also notions of linear, settler temporality as well. The Native is made into feral, savage flesh who is not only made non-sovereign at the moment of contact, but who, within the ontological ordering the settler world, was never sovereign, and who has no possibility of ever being sovereign. The latter is what Juarez describes as the processes designed to “the process of extracting the savageness from the Savage,” which, in tripartite fashion: [T]ransposes indigeneity from the Red body onto the Settler, commodifies the ontological resistance to whiteness found in indigenous lifeways to the point of no longer having any resistance to the ravishing of capitalist valuation and deracinates the Savage to the point of social death. A tri-operative process, the grammar of civilization hollows out the Indian, mines any cultural accouchements and values, and places them within the prerogative and definitions of value of the Settler (2014). Additionally, while the violences of settler colonialism are structural and ontological, it is also enacted in a quotidian fashion by the settler population itself. As Wolfe noted, there is, from the Indigenous perspective, a fundamental inability to separate the individual settler from the settler state, with the former being the latter’s principal agent of expansion (2016). Antiblack Violence and the Continued Inheritance of Enslaveability Along with the clearing of the continent of Indigenous Peoples, within the racial discourses of the northern bloc, as thinkers as diverse as Sora Han (2002), Jared Sexton (2008) and Angela Harris (2000) have noted, Blackness is equated with an inherent (and inheritable) status of enslaveability and criminality, and is marked for permanent exclusion from the social fold. While, as sociologist Loïc Wacquant has pointed out, the particular manifestations of this process have evolved over time—from chattel slavery, to Jim Crow, to the ghetto to the modern hyperghetto with its accompanying carceral continuum (the ghetto to prison to ghetto circuit)—the underlying logic has remained the same for the past several centuries (2010; 2002). Under this regime the Black body itself becomes a site of accumulation, nothing more than fungible property, which can then be subjected to gratuitous violence; that is, violence without the requirement of any previous transgression or reason within the social order. This is what Sexton, Frank B. Wilderson, III (2010) and other related theorists mean when they note that the grammars of suffering for Black life are accumulation and fungibility. The enduring legacy of the project to build an antiblack world (Gordon, 1995) is the direct line from enslaveability through lynching, extrajudicial executions of Black men, modern hyperincarceration and the criminalization of Blackness. All of this is enforced and made allowable by continuous, gratuitous antiblack violence. What is Fascism then to Native and Black People? So what then does fascism mean to us, the colonized, the Native and Black Peoples of this land, from whom it was stolen and who were stolen to work it? What does it mean for us if government are seized by a movement of fascists? What does it mean to us if Trump system-loyal right-wing national-populist, who, while not himself representing the kind of insurgent supremacist politics of a genuine fascist, still facilitates the rise and the existence of movements, theorists, organizers and influences who do espouse that commitment? To ask this question more specifically, what does the potential rise of fascism in the northern bloc of settler colonialism mean to Native and Black peoples who have suffered, and who continue to suffer, the hells of genocide, slavery, land theft, convict leasing, forced marches, Jim Crow, popular lynchings, public police murders, corralling and containment in reservations and ghettos, mass incarceration numbering in the millions, residential schools, economic quarantine and military occupation of our communities? What does fascist violence mean to us as peoples who already face structural processes that seek to drive us to alcoholism, drug abuse, suicide, mental illness and abject poverty, and which, in collusion with the more blatant aspects of our colonial oppression, seek to wipe out Native and Black Bodies? What does fascist violence mean to us when we already live under such states identified by Jodi Byrd as “unlivable, ungrievable conditions within the state-sponsored economies of slow death and letting die” (2011: 38). Thus it may seem that to equate our current status with fascism is erroneous, if not outright outrageous, given what our peoples have already experienced, and what we continue to experience on a daily basis. However, with that said, we should not ignore the potential for violence in excess of standard settler colonial operating techniques of governance that the modern fascist movement within the northern bloc holds. This is seen most starkly in the Quebec City mosque shootings. While the suspect, Alexandre Bissonnette, appears to have acted alone, we must not forget that this is a city where the local Soldiers of Odin chapter has stated that is wishes to launch patrols of Islamic neighbourhoods. In general we can say that, as noted by Stephen Pearson (2017), in excess of the right-wing national-populism of Trump and his canadian interlocutors, these forces, whether they explicitly engage in the kind of German nazi fetishism associated with such individuals and organizations Andrew Anglin of The Daily Stormer or the National Socialist Movement, something which many people continue to stereotype as the most publicly visible mark of fascism, they all thirst for a new frontier, for recolonization, for territories, for a white homeland. In other words, they thirst for the fulfilment of the settler dream—which is a project, it is important to note, they think has failed—to be dreamt anew. And in this we also return to distinction between a genuine fascist movement, which is a movement of insurgent rightists, and the system-loyal right-wing national-populism of the Trump presidency. While Trump drove home the slogan “make America great again,” it was not fundamentally premised on the idea that the american project had failed. The modern fascist movement of the northern bloc however embraces a politic that embodies a love for what america “might have been, if only.” In this sense it is a rhetoric and politic different from that of the Trump presidency (or, again, its canadian cognates) not only in form, but also in essence. Indeed, we must recognize that it exceeds the standard settler colonial project of settler self-Indigenization (though, of course, they engage in this as well) by way of a complete embrace of the settler self, including all its horrors. It is a proclamation of reassertion: white power naked and with no smiling lies. It is white power that is not only unashamed, but proud (Pearson, 2017). Ultimately, however, this issue does fold back in on itself, because of the fact of the foundational anti-Native and antiblack violence of the political project that created and sustains the northern bloc of settler colonialism. Such violence is ever omnipresent. The basal liberalism of settler colonial political life and civil society has always articulated a war over life and death with two fundamental aims: the elimination and dispossession of Native peoples and the subjugation and violent exclusion of Black peoples. In this regard, liberalism and fascism within the contours of the northern bloc can be properly placed on the same ethico-political continuum, one that is rooted in Native and Black death. In this, the fires of foundational Native and Black death, of the fact of ongoing invasion and settler colonialism, the final inadequcies of the Dimitrovian formulation of fascism are exposed and burdned away. And so here we return again to the question of colonial violence in the politic of fascism, because from the perspective of colonized life, whether the governing political logic of the colonial state is liberal or fascist, the fundamental warfare remains in place. The principal threat then of fascism to colonized peoples is not that we would move from a state of having not been subjected to violence from every possible angle to one where we would, but rather that the pacing of the eliminative and accumulative logics of settler colonialism would be accelerated to their fullest possible potential. This means that in the final analysis the question being posed to Native and Black peoples by our erstwhile white left allies, who right now are sounding the anti-fascist alarm, is an impossible choice between non-fascist, nominally “democratic” colonialism, and fascist colonialism. Not only is this an impossible choice, but it is also, as I have sought to show, a false one, because what is fascism in the face of gruelling colonial violence without end? At best the choice lies between a slow (“democratic”) and a fast (fascist) colonialism, in which the latter would most certainly accelerate the northern bloc’s underlying anti-Native and antiblack logics. Even the placing of anti-fascist theory and praxis within an explicitly communist perspective is unable to, in itself, offer us shelter or solution. This is because Native and Black ghosts, both living and dead, haunt the possibilities of socialism well. As I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere (2016), a socialism, whether marxist or anarchist, that does not, at the deepest possible level, engage with and seek to combat the fact of settler colonialism can only result in its own reconfiguration of the arrangements of settler power into a new form, nominally in the hands of the working class. The possibility of a newly socialized dispensation of settler colonialism could only be described as national socialism pure and simple. Our ghosts cry out for something different. Thus, we cannot choose between “democratic” colonialism, even a socialist one, and fascist colonialism because the ultimate problem is the same: colonialism.

#### The distributional logic of the aff remains wedded to the dispossession of native lands and resources which implicates their ability to solve the K because their theory utterly lacks the capacity to theorize violence of indigenous dispossession. Their impact arguments gain coherence through the transit of Indianness

Baker 17 (Oliver Baker, PhD Candidate Mellon Fellow American Literary Studies, Democracy, Class, and White Settler Colonialism, Public, Volume 28, Number 55, June 2017, pp. 144-153(10), JKS)

Today, Indianness continues, as Byrd puts it, to “transit U.S. empire” or put into motion, facilitate, and cohere the United States' settler imperial project that reaches around the world.12 It is through Indianness that settlers come to view the lands, resources, and bodies of the earth as spaces and objects of a barren wilderness (terra nullius) freely available for expropriation. The current and future populations living in spaces of the lands and controlling the resources that US settler imperialism attempts to seize or control are, as Byrd explains, made “Indian” or abjected as mindless terrorist-savages whose confrontation with the agents of enclosure is understood not as an attempt to resist and survive colonization, occupation, and genocide, but an irrational attack against society, civilization, humanity, and the forces of modern progress. In short, Indianness is what legitimates the process of primitive accumulation or what David Harvey calls "accumulation by dispossession," which is central to the formation, expansion, and dominance of global finance capitalism. What an understanding, then, of settler colonialism, Indigeneity, and Indianness demonstrates concerning the question of alliance-building among oppressed groups today is that political organizing through the spaces of the democratic commons or the identity of the settler wage labourer supports rather than disrupts the colonization of Indigenous peoples of North America. In the case of the democratic commons, calls for preserving and expanding the public institutions and spaces of liberal democracy in order to cultivate more radical and progressive forms of democracy is a demand not to undo or transform but to uphold the settler colonial state. As Byrd argues, “one reason why a post racial and just democratic society is a lost cause in the United States is that it is always already conceived through the prior disavowed and misremembered colonization of Indigenous lands that cannot be ended by further inclusion or more participation”14 Coulthard echoes this point, showing that “in liberal settler states...the commons' not only belong to somebody...they also deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior.”15 While it should be acknowledged that the democratic commons historically has served an important role in cultivating and producing emancipatory modes of analysis and forms of social belonging, such gains have nonetheless always depended upon the colonization of Indigenous peoples. Any defence, then, of the democratic commons today must at the same time defend Indigenous sovereignty. This means rethinking how groups relate in the spaces of the commons in ways that do not perpetuate liberal democracy's colonial project of building public institutions and democratic spaces through the seizure, theft, and colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and resources. Class-first models of a renewed workers' movement also risk reproducing colonial dispossession when they fail to recognize that the Indian and the settler wage labourer are structurally distinct categories of oppression. The former is constituted by dispossession through elimination, while the latter is structured by exploitation through hegemony. Even though exploited, settler wage labourers nonetheless come to experience their status in settler colonialism as a place of refuge and protection from dispossession and abjection. The role of the settler state is to ensure and safeguard the settler wage labourer's right not only to possess but not to be dispossessed of property, even if the only property the wage labourer possesses is labour power. In fact, possessing labour power as a commodity to sell on the market indexes the settler wage labourer's right and ability to enter the social contract and find security from the forms of structural exclusion naturalized in the position of the Indian. Such a status explains why, when neoliberal forms of precarious labour and exclusions from waged life increasingly target settler wage labourers, they are felt and represented as abnormal, undeserving, and, more importantly, grievable occurrences. The dispossession of settlers challenges the symbolic and material consistency of settler societies that are premised on dispossessing colonial peoples in order to reward and advantage settlers of all classes. Settler society retains and reproduces its coherence as the promised site of settler sovereignty, possession, and rights by figuring the neoliberal dispossession of settlers as the exception to be overcome if only because Indigenous dispossession remains the norm to be reproduced and repeated. The grievability of neoliberal dispossession, heard today in the refrain that globalization has “abandoned the white working class” depends upon the ungrievability and normalization of Indigenous dispossession that, in the narratives not only of manifest destiny but also the democratic commons and normative socialist futures, is depicted and accepted as a natural, inevitable, and necessary process. One of the limits, then, of calling for solidarity through the political identity of the wage labourer is that, in settler colonialism, what organized settler wage labourers demand is not necessarily an end to exploitation but the freedom, protection, and refuge from structural dispossession and exclusion that are normalized and naturalized in the social and racial ontologies of the Indian. Movements on behalf of settler labourers risk ending in reform rather than revolution precisely because they do not so much seek to confront capital as they seek refuge and protection within and through it.

#### Speculation is the logic of terra nulleus that coheres native dispossession.

Rosenburg 14 (Jordana Rosenberg, Literature Professor at UMass Amherst “The Molecularization of Sexuality: On Some Primitivisms of the Present,” *Theory & Event* Volume 17 Issue 2 GC)

Before we close this section, I want to make note of the ways in which primitive accumulation has received a fair amount of attention within the Humanities following David Harvey’s update to Rosa Luxemburg in the articulation of capital accumulation as grounded in processes of “accumulation by dispossession.” There has been some debate within settler colonial studies about this updating of the concept of primitive accumulation. Glen Coulthard has recently urged a focus on the spatial logic of dispossession inherent in primitive accumulation, against what he argues is the traditional understanding of primitive accumulation as the putting into place of a temporal logic: the wage-form, with its exploitation of the worker’s time.80 I want to think here about Coulthard’s intervention into political-economic accounts that occlude the spatial dynamics of settler dispossessions, and consider this work in relation to Brenna Bhandar’s recent investigations of the temporality of settler colonialism.81 For Bhandar, settler colonialism puts into place a property-logic that is significantly different from feudal use-based conceptions of land. In some contrast to pre-capitalist formations, settler colonialism constitutes the leading edge of capitalist forms of speculative possession. If at one point, property ownership was demonstrated in use (alternately, “occupation”), capitalist expropriation depends on “expectation of use.” Or, speculation: ““Whereas possession and use once justified ownership, the commoditization of land witnessed a shift in the conceptual underpinnings of ownership itself. While Locke had reconceived of land ownership, as based not on hereditary titles and inheritance (birthright), but on labor, Jeremy Bentham emphasizes expectation and security as the key justifications for private property ownership. In the work of Bentham, we see an abstract notion of ownership not based on physical possession, occupation, or even use, but the concept of ownership as a relation, based on an expectation of being able to use the property as one wishes. Primary to the property relation is law, which secures the property relation, or guards and protects the expectation.”82 Speculation – the expectation of use – requires the imposition of terrus nullius, or what Bhandar describes as a “wasteland rationale”: the legal codification of land as unpopulated to justify the speculative possession that ensues. The force of Bhandar’s argument here is to show that forms of speculative possession legitimate not only settler expropriations, but the property form more broadly. The dynamics of speculation are not confined to either financialization or the settler-form. Neither are the specifics of capitalist possession simply a bureaucratic carapace. Rather, they put in motion a range of affects (e.g., of expectation) that are inextricable from the property-form and from racialization more broadly. This feeling of expectation “comes to be materialized, or … to have an actual life, in how we are constituted as subjects” (12). “Possession … as a feeling … become[s] the sine qua non of ownership” (12). “Emergent forms of property ownership,” Bhandar argues, along with the affective effects of property, “were constituted with racial ontologies of settler and native, master and slave. This is as evident in the burgeoning realm of finance capital and its relationship to the slave trade as it is with regard to transformations in how the ownership of land is conceptualized in the colonial settler context.” Ontology itself, then, has a history. Its history is in many ways crystallized in the legal forms that remain with us still, and in the affective, economic, and political dimensions of racialization and settler colonialism. Put another way: “the relationship between being and having, or ontology and property ownership animates modern theories of citizenship and law” (3). Ontology cannot be thought outside of the spatial dispossessions to which Coulthard draws our attention. Nor can it be thought outside of the temporal character that Bhandar demonstrates as encoded in property relations. Bhandar and Coulthard together direct us toward an understanding of Marx’s annihilation of space by time as a racialized, spatial, settler expropriation that simultaneously deploys – indeed, weaponizes – temporality as a form of speculation. This spatio-temporal type of dispossession sets into place the property form and racial ontologies at once. It is at the heart of the “ontological illusions” that course through our social world, and it is at the heart, as well, of the forms of primitive accumulation that set in place the state-form and the ascriptions of citizenship. Thinking alongside Bhandar and Coulthard, we see more clearly now the ways in which “so-called primitive accumulation” – the narrative logics and conceptual forms that accompany transitional phases of capitalism – take the form of an origin-brink figuration: the removing, or wrenching of temporality from spatiality and from history.83 This figural annihilation of space by time, this origin narrative – one that gets reiterated in the ontological turn – brings together the temporal accelerations of financialization with the speculative settler-forms and speculation as a form of possession and racialized self-possession that together mark a contemporary moment of primitive accumulation. In closing this section, I want to return to the question of wasteland rationale to make a somewhat speculative suggestion of my own: that we understand the discourse of molecularization as a kind of abstract dispossession – or making-waste of the body – that is the condition of a fantasized speculative self-possession. In both Thacker and Preciado’s citations throughout, that is to say, we see a two-fold movement: the assertion of the body as the new ground of resource extraction and laying-waste of capitalism; and a speculative re-possession of that body (the hailing of the molecular as the future of political agency) on the condition of that body’s dispossession. What I have described as the ancestral future-casting of molecular agency, in other words, follows the abstract logic of the property form Bhandar lays out: when the social, historical contexts are elided from of our understanding of what embodiment is – of what molecules “are” or appear to be – then those molecules become the occasion for an anticipation, an affect of possession and agency that recalls the abstractions (and, indeed, the racial ontologies) at the heart of the property-form.84

#### **The intellectual project of the aff retreats into theory at the expense of material decolonization - the structure of settler colonialism is inherently tied to land, peoples, and relations that cannot be overcome by analysis alone.**

Strakosch & Macoun 20 (Elizabeth, Lecturer at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, and Alissa, lecturer in the School of Justice at Queensland University of Technology, Australia, “The violence of analogy: abstraction, neoliberalism and settler colonial possession,” *Postcolonial Studies,* Volume 23, Issue 4, pp. 505 - 506) lrm

In their now classic essay, ‘Decolonization is not a metaphor’, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang are clear that no intellectual moves – however sophisticated – will exempt us from the hard material work of decolonisation.2 Similarly, Linda Tuhiwai Smith notes that ‘[i]mperialism cannot be struggled over only at the level of text and literature. Imperialism still hurts, still destroys and is reforming itself constantly’.3 Colonial projects rely on many kinds of violence: military, economic, bureaucratic, psychological, carceral and racial. Importantly, their violence is also ideational and epistemological. Like many other scholars engaged in work on colonisation in the context of Indigenous sovereignty, we are concerned to help unravel the conceptual fabric holding these different forms of violence together. As colonisers and white members of a colonial political society structured in white racial dominance,4 we feel a particular responsibility to challenge this society’s silences, fictions and justifications. This means working to refuse the dehumanisation and erasure of Indigenous peoples, and – so far as we can – the alliances and excuses that complicity with this colonial society constantly offers us. For us, such a political project must involve interrogating any implicit claims that our political or intellectual commitments allow us to transcend our interests and locations, or free us from the structures in which we operate. Tuck challenges us to ask ourselves how we conceptualise mechanisms of change, and how we imagine that our research contributes to such transformation.5 It is in doing this that we come to question increasingly prominent theoretical moves to ‘renarrativise’ our colonial relationships, with the assumption that in doing so we substantively change their operation and provide a new basis for social struggle. Tuck and Yang’s formulation of decolonisation as not a metaphor is implicitly accompanied by the corollary, that colonialism is a deeply material set of political relationships to be struggled over in and from our concrete locations. As Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel note, ‘settler colonialism will not be undone by analysis alone, but through lived and contentious engagement with the literal and stolen ground on which people stand and come together’.6 A set of structures and relationships anchored in land, place and people cannot be transcended by political hot takes or sophisticated theoretical abstractions. Yet there are increasingly prominent threads in settler colonial and political theory that seem to attempt this. In this article we trace and challenge intellectual moves that work to distance theory from the material realities of colonisation and ‘solve’ colonial dilemmas through theoretical re-categorisations. The idea that finding the correct, hyper-critical take will transform us connects to the Enlightenment belief that individual rationality releases us from our material bondage, yet some Western critical theoretical traditions continue to operate within this framework of individualist intellectual liberation.7 This article is concerned with the violence we enact and fail to see, and the potential for transformative work we miss, when we follow this path of trying to think ourselves out of our predicaments. We suggest that the dangers of settlers ‘analysing’ our way out of complicity are amplified when we deploy analogy to build solidarity and reconceptualise ourselves as Indigenous. In the work we analyse here, the use of analogy is acknowledged but quickly lost as the new story of political relations, and of ourselves as outside neoliberal and colonial power structures, is naturalised and taken as a basis for action in the present.

#### The AFFs avowed anti-imperialism can only aspire to affix a post to colonialism that reifes settler violence.

Barker and Pickerill, 2012 (Adam J. Barker, and Jenny Pickerill, both in the Department of Geography @ the University of Leicester, “Through Shared Geographies: Why Anarchists Need to Understand Indigenous Connections to Land and Place”, *Antipode* 44.5, shae)

Settler Colonialism The growing understanding of the dynamics of colonial power in settler societies impacts anarchists concerned with anti-imperial, anti-colonial politics, and Indigenous peoples concerned with questions of freedom and cultural survival. Alfred describes the northern bloc settler colonial context as a “spiritual and psychological war of genocide and survival” and poses this important question: If we contrast this current turn of empire, represented by spiritual and cultural annihilation and the denial of authenticity, with the classic imperial strategy of brutal physical dispersion and dispossession, which often left the spiritual and cultural core of the surviving imperial subjects intact, could we with any certainty say which form of imperialism is more evil or effective in killing off nations in the long term? (Alfred 2005:128). Here also is the bind for Settler activists in the northern bloc: as much as anarchist Settler people occupy different conceptual spaces from non-radicalized Settler people, the dualistic divide between Settler and Indigenous identities remains. Well meaning anarchist Settler people may transgress in Indigenous conceptual space, ignorant of the dynamics of “personal terror” that “invariably infuses these relations” (Scott 1990:xi). Colonization, most especially settler colonization, has not and does not rely simply on the crude swapping of one people for another in place1; rather, entire ways of being in place, of perceiving spaces, underlie the colonial project. Were settler colonization simply about occupation, decolonization would involve primarily the reversal of colonial settlement: the removal of Settler societies and the “replacement” of Indigenous societies in their homelands. Such a course of action is not only simplistic; it is also unlikely to succeed. Further, it clashes with anarchistic ethics of “autonomous geographies” (Pickerill and Chatterton 2006) and Indigenous traditions of alliance and generosity (Sherman 2010:114–115). So, what does decolonization of a settler colonial society look like? How does a decolonized Settler identity relate to Indigenous peoples’ places? Answering these questions should be a primary goal of anarchist Settlers pursuing Indigenous solidarity; however, the pursuit is not so simple. While the heterogeneous makeup of anarchists involves an array of other discourses—race, class; tactics, ethics—in this discussion, anarchists in Settler societies remain largely, however ambiguously, connected to dynamics of settler colonialism. Anarchist methods often involve the formation of collectives that assert a differential autonomous capacity against centres of power involving the state and capital. However, this method is symmetrical with the historical settler colonization of the northern bloc, “characterised by a pattern of self-constituting local jurisdictions contesting the established claims of seaboard centres of power” (Veracini 2010:62). Veracini locates conceptual separation “at the origin of the settler project, the moment when a collective body ‘moves out’ in order to bring into effect an autonomous political will” (63). For anarchists, this separation is political rather than physical, but the colonial dynamic remains the same. This common foundational basis opens the possibility of well-meaning Settler anarchists appropriating Indigenous thought, symbolism and language of resistance into settler colonial discourses through “modernist ‘affinity’” and “post-modern quotation” (Haig-Brown 2010:930). This constitutes a kind of narrative transfer wherein “a radical discontinuity within the settler body politic is emphasised, and references to its ‘postcolonial status’ are made” (Veracini 2010:42). This type of narrative transfer can support denials of responsibility (“I cannot be colonial because I fight the state!”), or the collapse of indigenous autonomy into a “multicultural” or other “fair” social arrangement (43). Given the persistence of the “first discourse”—the discourse of Settler peoples— and the difficulty and complexity of learning (without appropriating) Indigenous discourses (Haig-Brown 2010:932–935), it is no surprise that settler colonial dynamics continue to subtly inform even anarchist and other “radically democratic” (Veracini 2010:63) settler collectives. The multiple institutions of privilege operating in Settler society often confer, without consent, colonial privilege on Settler people (including anarchists) unattainable by Indigenous peoples. For example, whiteness has been shown to operate in Canadian “multicultural” society in ways that continue to privilege whiteness above all racialized identities, Indigeneity included (O’Connell 2010; Shaw 2006). Meanwhile, institutions of patriarchy and intolerant secularism can be shown to be at work even inside anarchist organizations engaging with Indigenous peoples (Lagalisse 2011), demonstrating that anarchist analysis alone is not protection against participation in dominating power dynamics.

#### Thus, the only alternative is one of decolonization.

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck, associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, State University of New York at New Paltz. And K. Wayne Yang, Ph.D., Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley, University of California, San Diego*. Decolonization is not a metaphor.* Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, pp. 35-36 GC)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. **Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.**

### 1nc – Case

#### Their Davies ev – a reason to vote negative – says facticity is bad and doesn’t influence politics – that means epistemic shifts don’t produce political change – vote neg on presumption.

#### Telos- they have now way at which point their praxis is complete CX proves they advocate for infinite transitions and no end point

#### The affirmative’s desire to produce more effective knowledge invests in facticity and turns the aff – it literally says facts can’t change opinions, their only offense is epistemic shifts good which links hard to our K of intellectual theorization.

#### All of their impacts about scarcity are only resolved through material conditions they can’t solve because they divest from collective resistance

#### The academy and the links make the logic of gift giving impossible

Kuokkanen 7 Rauna Johanna (Sami) associate professor of pedagogy and indigenous studies at Sami University College, Norway, Reshaping the University: responsibility, indigenous epistemes, and the logic of the gift, UBC Press, Vancouver ISBN 978-0-7748-1356-3, mmm, p 131-133

Hospitality has two different but inalienable dimensions. On the one hand, there are the laws (in the plural) of hospitality - the conditions, norms, rights, and duties imposed on hosts and guests. These laws mark the various practices and conventions that we usually think of when referring to hospi­tality.18 Laws of hospitality are often ethnically encoded and may clash, even violently, in situations where “individuals are represented as belong­ing to separate 'cultures,' separate 'communities."'19 The assumption that there can be a simple coexistence of different modes of monolithic hospi­tality - that forms of hospitality can remain separate and uninfluenced by one another - are, however, too simplistic. Laws of hospitality vary even within a cultural or national group along gender and class lines.20 Besides the laws of hospitality, there is the law of hospitality, the unconditionality that requires an unquestioning welcome. Absolute hospitality asks for opening up one's home, for giving not only to the foreigner but to the “absolute, unknown, anonymous other ... that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity ( entering into a pact) or even their names."21 Infinite hospitality contradicts the laws of hospitality, yet it is inseparable from them. Without one, there cannot be the other. 22 Indigenous peoples gave unconditional, infinite hospitality to the early settlers and colonizers. This is also what is needed in the contemporary academy: receiving and welcoming without invitation. This form of hospi­tality opens to the '' other" infinitely. If the academy only welcomes what it is ready to welcome - that is, what it recognizes and what it considers it must welcome - it is not hospitality. It is not a welcome but rather a duty, a mandatory protocol, an act of superficial political correctness or token rec­ognition without hospitality. Hospitality has to be rendered to the “other" before the “other" is known.23 Unconditional hospitality may seem a risk, but as Rosello argues, "hospitality without risk usually hides more serious violence. A perfectly gracious and generous host may be capitalizing on dark shadows, on ghosts that haunt his land, his house, his social posi­tion."24 The academy represents itself as a welcoming host, but not without conditions. Indigenous epistemes are unconditionally welcome only to a handful of marginal spaces that are insignificant to the academy at large. The shadows and ghosts that haunt the academy in relation to indigenous epistemes are legacies of structures of domination and mechanisms of con­trol, which deny the existence of other intellectual conventions and which continue the academy's complicity in colonialism. The hospitality of the academy must consist of two critical components: a welcome of the "other" without conditions (such as translations or defini­tions) and openness to learning about the logic of the gift and indigenous epistemes. The latter must be given an unconditional welcome Without ask­ing their names; they must not be violated by demands that they be trans­coded into the language of the host. Unconditional welcome also requires an openness to be taught and the ethical singularity of learning to learn. Emmanuel Levinas argues: "To approach the Other in discourse, is to wel­come his [sic] expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught."25 Levinas argues for the ability to receive and to be taught. This is what many indigenous peoples extended to the foreigner and the "absolute other," who was received as a stranger but also as a guest. (The foreigner was con­sidered a stranger also because of his strange appearance and peculiar hab­its. The dominant discourse is saturated with explorers' and settlers' accounts of the strangeness of indigenous peoples; only recently has attention been paid to the fact that people from overseas seemed equally strange to their hosts.26) Indigenous people were eager to welcome the "other" because they wanted to learn from the stranger - to be open to the “other" and to be taught. Europeans were sometimes perceived as having a special relation­ship with the spirit world owing to their strange powers and novel material goods.27 Naturally, the hosts were keen to share the power and knowledge of their guests. By saying welcome, the academic institution, represented by various elected or chosen individuals, assumes the role of the host. By welcoming the "others" (current and prospective students, new faculty, visitors, and so on), the institutional apparatus of the academy not only perceives itself as at home and capable of giving hospitality but also appropriates the place of the host and the master of the house. The academy as an institution does not hesitate to impose itself as the host; this reflects the mentality of the early colonial period, when foreigner-guests seized the role of host. If we compare colonialism to a situation in which a stranger moves into your house and takes over and starts telling you how to live, the contemporary academy continues to be implicated in this scenario. Most universities lo­cated on indigenous peoples' lands practise wilful amnesia in ignoring the presence of the original hosts.28 The academy's refusal as an institution to address the history of colonial relations poses a serious obstacle to establish­ing contemporary relations of hospitality. This refusal also places indigen­ous students and faculty local to the area in a deeply antagonistic situation. They possess “a unique sense of the history of the institution and the com­munity," yet they remain the most profoundly problematic outsiders in the academy.29 That the university is their neighbour, if not a self-proclaimed guest-master on their lands, yet refuses to recognize them and (even less so) their epistemes, perpetuates the colonial relations of domination in a con­temporary setting and makes reciprocity and the gift logic impossible.

#### Rather than renegotiating or forgiving any specific debt we must abolish the very conditions which make debt relations possible. Debt abolition is necessary to produce a process of reciprocity outside of settler hierarchies.

Kim 18 (Jodi, associate professor of media and cultural studies at the University of California, Riverside. She is the author of Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (2010) and coeditor of Critical Ethnic Studies: A Reader (2016). “Settler Modernity, Debt Imperialism, and the Necropolitics of the Promise” Social Text 135 Vol. 36, No. 2 June 2018 ppgs 54-57 GC)

The creation of crushing indebtedness through the necropolitics of the promise, or debt as the foreclosure of freedom, futurity, and at times of life itself, enjoins us to ask how debt as both a literal and figurative economy also emerges as the effect of freedom, emancipation, or liberation. Saidiya Hartman writes that emancipation for the enslaved in the US instituted indebtedness via a calculus of blame and responsibility through which the newly freed were obliged to repay their emancipators’ “investment of faith” and demonstrate their worthiness. This figurative economy of indebtedness compelling submission and servitude was conjoined to a literal one in which Black laborers were rendered vulnerable to peonage and debt servitude. In this way, the transition from slavery to freedom, writes Hartman, constructed “an already accrued debt, abstinent present, and a mortgaged future. In short, to be free was to be a debtor—that is, obliged and duty-bound to others.”51 Yet what of debt when whole nations are also “liberated”? In this instance, gratitude is enfigured as indebtedness through the scripting of military intervention and imperial violence as a bestowal or gift of national liberation. If the literal financial economy of debt can be rewritten as a form of US imperial power, debt can also function as a figurative economy or narrative structure animating that power. The United States is able to leverage, convert, and narrate indebtedness into imperial might. Yet the structure of feeling imposed on those who are “liberated” from imperial or colonial domination is one of gratitude or indebtedness. Writing in the context of US imperialism in Asia, Lisa Yoneyama argues that the “imperialist myth of liberation and rehabilitation” confers belatedness and indebtedness.52 The newly liberated nation, a pre- or protodemocracy, experiences a belatedness vis-à-vis political modernity. Yet it must demonstrate again and again an indebtedness to its imperial liberator for making the presumed eventual arrival at political modernity possible in the first place. But in the end, this moment of arrival never quite arrives, so the debt can never be fully repaid.53 If debt can thus be the foreclosure of freedom as well as its effect, I am compelled to ask, by way of a conclusion, how we might abolish the debt relation altogether. To be clear, this call for debt abolition is different from debt forgiveness. The latter only clears particular debts, whereas the former eliminates debt as such. Put differently, this is to ask about the difference between the abolishment of settler modernity and “forgiveness” industries and processes such as liberal philanthropy, truth and reconciliation commissions, reparations, and transitional justice. These latter processes are the symptoms of, the placeholders for, an as yet unrealized horizon. For the figurative debt, might it be possible to enact a politics that calls on us to view the debt not as an invitation to coevality or liberal political modernity that we cannot refuse, but as an engulfment into the suffocating embrace of imperial and gendered racial violence? For the literal debt, this politics calls on us to refuse the debt by harnessing the power of a collective default against the bullying threat of US debt imperialism. This is to embrace something along the lines of what Fred Moten and Stefano Harney call the place of bad debt, “the debt that cannot be repaid . . . the debt without creditor, the black debt, the queer debt, the criminal debt”54—and the student debt. This debt without creditor gestures to an alternative social relation and economy and refuses quid pro quo calculations of reciprocity. Indeed, if debt in an alternative sense is a lateral form of reciprocity and obligation, or the very thing that makes sociality possible, the debt regimes of liberal military empire and settler colonialism have converted and perverted that sociality into necropolitical social hierarchy. In this sense, to inquire into this conversion is to perform a social autopsy, to encounter the mortuary of the already dead and the living dead, all the while apprehending that what remains and awaits our embrace are those stubborn refusals.

#### The demand of the 1AC falls into the dialectic of recognition that consolidates the settler university- even if the content of their AFF might be refusal it functions as academic recognition in form- this turns the case and fuels our links because any solvency argument is forced complicity in a colonized space.

Grande 18 (Sandy, Professor of Education at Connecticut University. Dissident Knowledge: Refusing the University. Pp.176-180 GC)

Historically, the university functioned as the institutional nexus for the capitalist and religious missions of the settler state, mirroring its history of dispossession, enslavement, exclusion, forced assimilation, and integration. As noted by Craig Wilder (2014), author of Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled History of America’s Universities, the academy was both a “beneficiary and defender” of the same social and economic forces that “transformed West and Central Africa through the slave trade and devastated indigenous nations in the Americas” (2–3). He writes, American colleges were not innocent or passive beneficiaries of conquest and colonial slavery. The European invasion of the Americas and the modern slave trade pulled peoples throughout the Atlantic world into each others’ lives, and colleges were among the colonial institutions that braided their histories and rendered their fates dependent and antagonistic. The academy never stood apart from American slavery—in fact it stood beside church and state as the third pillar of a civilization built on bondage. (Wilder 2014, 11) Across the text, Wilder similarly registers (albeit unevenly) how the academy also never stood apart from the genocide and dispossession of Indigenous peoples, all of which illuminates the university’s history as a long-time co-conspirator in perpetuating white supremacy. Indeed, it was not until the dawn of the Civil Rights Movement that the underlying justification for institutional exclusion and segregation was broadly questioned as incompatible with the norms of liberal democracy. During this time, the university became one of the primary sites of struggle and social transformation. In “Black Study, Black Struggle,” Kelley recounts the rich tradition of Black studies advanced through the “mass revolt” of “insurgent intellectuals” committed to the development of “fugitive spaces” not just outside but also in opposition to the Eurocentric university. He cites the works of James Baldwin, Ella Baker, Walter Rodney, Frantz Fanon, Angela Davis, Barbara Smith, C. L. R James, and Cedric Robinson, among others, as the “sources of social critique” that helped to inspire alternative spaces like the Mississippi Freedom Schools. The aim was not simply to offer a broader, more inclusive curriculum but rather to design one that examined power along the axes of race and class, developing “trenchant critiques of materialism” that challenged “the myth that the civil rights movement was just about claiming a place in mainstream society” (Kelley 2016). The desire, as articulated by Kelley, was not for “equal opportunity in a burning house” but, rather, “to build a new house.” But since the settler university can only “remove to replace,” it was not long before the revolutionary and redistributive aims of Black radicalism were supplanted by and absorbed within the project of liberal pluralism, substituting the anti-capitalist critique with a politics of recognition as inclusion. So that now, the structures of settler logics render the demands of #ConcernedStudent1950 virtually illegible, except as expressed as the desire for more “intense inclusion” (Kelley 2016). As Kelley argues, while demands for safe spaces, greater diversity, mental health counselling, curricular representation, and renamed campus buildings are hardly inconsequential, they also have the potential to function as inducements, a “promise project” waged on a series of (non)promises made to those who remain outside of and excluded by the university (Agathangelou et al. 2008). Thus, just as recognition-based politics impede Indigenous struggles for decolonization, they also constrain efforts for a more radical vision for Black study and struggle within and against the university. In other words, the settler state has an array of strategies—recognition being one of them—to placate dispossessed people while evading any effort to change the underlying power structure. Within the context of the liberal academy, discourses of recognition garner wide appeal, as they provide a means for neatly bracketing what are fundamentally complex and ongoing sets of power relations. That is, they mark a definitive endpoint to a history of wrongdoing, as well as a means for moving beyond that history (Corntassel and Holder 2008). Consider, for example, the growing wave of colleges and universities seeking to reconcile their involvement in the slave trade. The University of Alabama (in 2004), the University of Virginia (in 2007), and Emory University (in 2011) have all issued formal apologies. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill erected a memorial, Washington and Lee removed all its confederate flags, and the College of William and Mary launched an investigation into its history of complicity. After it came to public light that Georgetown University sold 272 enslaved men, women, and children (the youngest was two months old) in 1838 in order to avoid bankruptcy (sale proceeds are estimated at $3.3 million in today’s dollars), university alumni helped launch the “Memory Project,” an initiative dedicated to tracing and locating living descendants of those sold. In 2003, Brown University launched one of the most comprehensive projects that included a commissioned three-year study, an acknowledgement, a memorial, and an endowment for Providence city schools. Still, over ten years later, only 7.3 per cent of Brown’s student body and 4 per cent of its faculty are African American. And no institution to date has offered reparations. Despite (or because of?) its failure to restructure material conditions, recognition continues to serve as the dominant framework for addressing the persistence of structural racism. Just as it fails to address the dual structures of settler colonialism, it fails to address the interplay between the affective economy and material conditions of institutional racism. And, thus, as noted by Kelley (2016), student activists now unwittingly participate in their own domination by parroting the discourses of recognition. Indeed, a thematic analysis of student demands issued across seventy institutions shows that 88 per cent demanded either changes to curricula or diversity training (especially for faculty); 87 per cent demanded more support for students of colour (i.e., multicultural centres, residence halls, financial aid, mental health services); 79 per cent demanded greater faculty diversity; and 24 per cent desired apologies and acknowledgments. It is not so much the nature of the demands per se that Kelley takes issue with but rather their framing through the discourse of personal trauma and the potential to “slip into” thinking about “ourselves as victims and objects rather than agents” (Kelley 2016). In some instances (e.g., DePaul University, University of Wisconsin, Madison), faculty have formed coalitions with students, registering their own demands for recognition. Faculty grievances generally respond to recent attacks on tenure, the exploitation of contingent faculty, and increasing violations of academic freedom, which disproportionately impact women and faculty of colour. One of the most recent and widely celebrated texts to narrate both the struggle and political project of women of colour in the academy is Presumed Incompetent: The Intersections of Race and Class for Women in Academia (Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. 2012). According to the authors, the central aim of the text is to provide a space for women to “name their wounds in order to heal them,” and their collective demand is for future generations of women of colour to enjoy “more fulfilling, respectful and dignified experiences” (Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. 2012, xx). The thirty personal narratives of the contributors each capture the visceral nature of racism and sexism as played out upon their bodies. The importance of putting a face to what often goes unnamed and dismissed cannot be underestimated. The women’s stories underscore the effect of non- and misrecognition as not only dehumanizing but also cumulative; as Kelley (2016) notes, “the trauma is real.” While these aims are indisputable—everyone deserves respect and dignified experiences at work—the political project seems to end there. Among the one hundred-plus recommendations made in the final chapter of Presumed Incompetent, none call for collective action against the neoliberal capitalist or settler logics that situate women in asymmetric relations of power in the first place. Their main contention is not with the structures and systems of domination that gave rise to the university but rather with women’s inability to fully participate in them (and thus have access to the inducements associated with its recognition). This aim is most evident in the following passage: The essays in Presumed Incompetent point . . . toward the Third World Feminist recognition that the business of knowledge production, like the production of tea, spices, and bananas, has an imperialist history that it has never shaken. Inventing the postcolonial university is the task of the twenty-first century. We can only hope that this task of decolonizing American academia is completed before the tenure track itself disappears. Otherwise scholars in the next century may confront another ironic example of women finally rising in a profession just as it loses its prestige and social value. (Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. 2012, xx) Ultimately, the demand for belonging and inclusion—for presumed competence—is mobilized through a politics of recognition that not only legitimates the institution’s power over women of colour but also mistakes the formation of an intellectual elite (even if it is an elite of colour) for radical social change. And as Robin Kelley (2016) urges, “The fully racialized social and epistemological architecture upon which the modern university is built cannot be radically transformed by ‘simply’ adding darker faces, safer spaces, better training, and a curriculum that acknowledges historical and contemporary oppressions.” Indeed, the “promise project” extended by such forms of recognition may only serve to domesticate aspirations of liberation.